Bay of Plenty Group Evacuation Plan

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PRELIMINARY

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS PLAN

BoP  Bay of Plenty
CDEM  Civil Defence Emergency Management
CDEMG  Civil Defence Emergency Management Group
CDC  Civil Defence Centre
CEG  Coordinating Executive Group
DHB  District Health Board, includes hospital, health and ambulance service
EMO  Emergency Management Office
EOC  Emergency Operations Centre (used in reference to a local CDEM EOC)
ES  Emergency Services
GECC or ECC  Group Emergency Coordination Centre
IAP  Incident Action Plan
LUC  Lifeline Utility Coordinator
MCDEM  Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MSD  Ministry of Social Development
NCMC  National Crisis Management Centre
NECC  National Emergency Coordination Centre
PIM  Public Information Manager
SOP  Standard Operating Procedure
SitRep  Situation Report
SPCA  Royal New Zealand Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
TA or TLA  Territorial Authority (includes city, district and unitary authorities)
TRG  Transport Response Group (Group)
TRT  Transport Response Team (National)
USAR  Urban Search and Rescue
WCG  Welfare Coordinating Group

A full Glossary of Terms is included in Appendix C.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Bay of Plenty CDEMG also acknowledge the Waikato CDEM Group for allowing their Group Evacuation Plan to be used as a template for this plan. The Group also acknowledges the use of the MCDEM Mass Evacuation Guidelines (a full list of reference documents is included in Appendix C).
SUMMARY OF THE EVACUATION PROCESS

Figure 1 provides a summary of the key steps in the Evacuation Process.

Threat / Hazard with potential for large scale evacuation.

Provide hazard info/ analysis (BoP RC, Warning Agencies).

CDEM Group / ECC

1. Activate ECC and establish contact with key agencies.

2. Evaluate information provided, establish scope and scale and decide whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place.

3. Advise key stakeholders that evacuation decision made and timing / location details being confirmed.

4. Develop Evacuation IAP - evacuation areas, staging

5. Coordinate development/issue of public messaging

6. Coordinate implementation of Evacuation IAP. Monitor agency progress, situation reporting, issues identification and resolution.

Other Agencies

1. Activate CDEM EOC and other agency crisis management structures and establish EOC/ECC liaison (all).


3. Prepare to evacuate facilities and client organisations and deploy resources to support shelter phase (all).

4. Update info on evacuee no.s/types, public transport resources (CDEM EOC)

5. Identify evacuation routes, traffic management, deploy resources (road authorities, in liaison ES, CDEM EOC).

6. Coordinate development/issue of public messaging

7. Local public warnings (ES supported by CDEM EOC, NZDF).

8. Implement evacuation plans of own facilities and monitor ‘client’ facilities.

9. Assist vulnerable groups to evacuate (ES)

10. Clear and secure evacuated areas (ES)

11. Implement plans to maintain fuel supply along evacuation routes & to CDEM Critical customers (fuel co)

12. Establish traffic management / rest areas and maintain access for priority vehicles (road authorities, supported by Police, CDEM EOC)

13. Coordinate evacuation by rail (NCMC / Joint Crisis Mgt Group (Rail) and bus (local CDEM / bus companies)

14. Establish CDCs - registration, accommodation, recovery (local CDEM supported by WAG)

15. Ongoing coordination and information exchange

Figure 1: Summary of the Evacuation Process
1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVES

The purpose of this Plan is to support a coordinated response with neighbouring regions, local CDEM EOCs and all supporting agencies when managing a large scale evacuation. This is achieved by confirming the:

- Group arrangements for evacuation, including the overall framework, principles and assumptions.
- Communication processes between agencies.
- Roles and responsibilities of responding agencies to allow them to effectively plan for and support large scale evacuations.
- Framework for formalising local CDEM and supporting agency plans and arrangements.

1.2 SCOPE

This Plan provides the framework for agencies to coordinate a large scale evacuation. The detailed operational plans lie with local CDEM EOCs and the agencies supporting the evacuation.

The audience for this Plan include the key agencies involved in the evacuation and shelter phases of an emergency - local authorities, local and group CDEM agencies, neighbouring region CDEM groups, emergency services, lifeline utilities and welfare agencies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Within Plan Scope</th>
<th>Outside Plan Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Processes to support external and internal regional evacuation and receipt of evacuees.</td>
<td>Plans, arrangements and operational processes of neighbouring regions, local EOCs and other agencies with a role in evacuation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships between agencies with a role in managing a Group evacuation and provision of welfare support.</td>
<td>Arrangements of government agencies to evacuate their own and client facilities (eg: Corrections, Health).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaison arrangements between regions and between EOCs.</td>
<td>The recovery phase (after the decision to return has been made).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes from the point at which Evacuation may need to be considered to when the decision has been made to evacuate until the decision to return.</td>
<td>Evacuations that are within the capabilities of the local EOCs even if it is across TLAs or regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Detailed resource lists (held in local CDEM Evacuation Plans).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key Terms:

Evacuation is the movement of people away from the threat or actual occurrence of a hazard either forced or voluntary.

The evacuation of a particular area is necessary when a hazard, be it natural or technological, threatens and puts at risk the safety of those within an area, or following the impact of a hazard which has subsequently rendered the area uninhabitable.

Evacuation becomes necessary when the benefits of leaving significantly outweigh the risk of sheltering-in-place.

Mass Evacuation is a large scale evacuation that is led by a CDEM Group or National Crisis Management Centre. Factors that may determine that an event requires a mass evacuation include:

- Declaration has or is likely to be made.
- Local resources are unable to cope.
- Cross regional coordination is required to manage the movement of people.

In these guidelines we have adopted the term Group Evacuation as it is predominantly aimed at events that will be led by the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Controller or National Controller.
1.3 PLAN FRAMEWORK

As illustrated in Figure 1.1, this Plan is:

- Guided by the National CDEM Plan and Guide, Director’s Guidelines and the Bay of Plenty Group CDEM Plan.
- Consistent with neighbouring region’s evacuation plans and other Bay of Plenty Group Plans and Procedures.
- Delivered through the operational plans of local EOCs and supporting agencies.

1.4 ALIGNMENT WITH NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS

This Plan is structured to align with the process outlined in the Director’s Mass Evacuation Guidelines, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.

1.5 EVACUATION SCENARIOS

In order to understand the potential size and scale of events that may be managed under this Plan, Table 1.2 shows hazard scenarios that may cause large numbers of evacuees into/out of or within the region.
Table 1.2: Evacuation Scenarios showing Indicative numbers of Total Evacuees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Bay of Plenty</th>
<th>Auckland</th>
<th>Waikato</th>
<th>Hawkes Bay</th>
<th>Gisborne</th>
<th>Manawatu-Wanganui</th>
<th>Taranaki</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auckland CBD volcanic eruption</td>
<td>10,000 – 50,000 into region</td>
<td>100-300,000 evacuees, half evacuate out of region.</td>
<td>20,000 - 100,000, into region.</td>
<td>Up to 10,000 across these regions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Central Island volcano</td>
<td>5,000-10,000 into region.</td>
<td>5,000-10,000 into region.</td>
<td>Up to 50,000 total evacuees in near vicinity, half supported within region.</td>
<td>Will be managing their own populations impacted, unlikely to be able to also receive evacuees from other regions (except self-managing ones).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major volcano within BoP region</td>
<td>50,000 – 100,000 total evacuees. Half go out of region.</td>
<td>Up to 20,000</td>
<td>Up to 20,000</td>
<td>Up to 20,000 across these regions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Tsunami impacting East Coast</td>
<td>Each region is likely to be managing its own evacuees if whole north island east coast impacted. Insufficient modelling has been carried out to be able to even roughly total evacuees, but could be total 100,000-200,000 across island?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Flood (eg: Opotoki, Whakatane Rivers)</td>
<td>Up to 40,000 impacted –most shelter in region (mostly short term evac).</td>
<td>&lt;5,000</td>
<td>&lt;5,000</td>
<td>Up to 5,000 across these regions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Mt Taranaki eruption</td>
<td>&lt;3,000 into region</td>
<td>&lt;5,000 into region</td>
<td>&lt;5,000 into region</td>
<td>&lt;3,000 into region</td>
<td>&lt;2,000 into region</td>
<td>5,000 – 10,000 into region</td>
<td>Up to 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Fire in Bay of Plenty</td>
<td>Up to 10,000 evacuees, most stay in region.</td>
<td>&lt;500 into region.</td>
<td>&lt;500 into region.</td>
<td>Up to 2,000 across these regions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>Up to 50,000</td>
<td>Up to 5,000</td>
<td>Up to 5,000</td>
<td>Up to 5,000 across these regions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Limitations and assumptions include:

- These figures are meant to be broadly indicative and are based on rough estimates at workshops with CDEM Stakeholders in May 2014. The table is therefore meant to enable regions to have a broad understanding of the potential scale of evacuations, rather than provide guidance as to expected numbers if an event occurs. The actual numbers will depend on many factors such as season, public messaging (eg: where people are being directed).

- It is estimated that up to 30% of evacuees will need support at some stage – again, the actual number will depend on many factors.

- Evacuee numbers will fluctuate. The initial numbers may drop off quite quickly once the impacted area is understood and people return to their homes (eg: people may evacuate from a tsunami / flood threat which ends up not impacting their homes). Conversely, if conditions for those sheltering-in-place are poor, welfare numbers may increase over time.
2. REGIONAL CONTEXT

2.1 THE HAZARDS

The Bay of Plenty region is subject to a wide range of natural hazards. The primary natural hazards of significance to the region include flooding, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and tsunami. Figure 2.1 shows areas that are most vulnerable to different hazard types.

This section provides an overview of each hazard and how the hazard type may impact on the evacuation process.

⇒ More detailed hazard information is available in the Bay of Plenty CDEM Plan, the Regional Policy Statement and on the Bay of Plenty Regional Council website.

FLOODING

The Bay of Plenty is typically affected by two distinct types of flooding; short intense periods of rainfall causing small streams and stormwater flooding primarily in urban areas and long sustained rainfall events causing flooding in larger streams and river catchments. The Bay of Plenty is crossed by many rivers and streams, typically sourced in steep bush catchments before flowing through productive farmland and often through densely populated urban areas. Five flood protection schemes are managed across seven rivers in the eastern Bay of Plenty to mitigate the hazard.

The main factor relating to flooding which will impact on evacuation is that many State Highways are vulnerable to flooding and slips which may cause road closures and isolate communities.

VOLCANIC ERUPTIONS

The Bay of Plenty is exposed to both local and distal volcanic hazards. In the Bay of Plenty Region there are four active volcanic centres; the Okataina Volcanic Centre, Mt Edgecumbe/Pūtauaki, Mayor Island/Tūhua and White Island/Whaakari. These represent four very different levels of hazard to the region.

The Okataina Volcanic Centre is a caldera volcano and produces infrequent but large volcanic eruptions. In a major eruption, the near vent area (within 5-10 km) could be totally destroyed and all distal portions of the BOP region may receive significant ashfalls (0.1-1 m). The topography impounding existing lakes could be impacted by an eruption, leading to large scale break-out floods. Remobilisation of ashfall deposits could create erosional issues for year to decades.

Mt Edgecumbe/Pūtauaki is a young multiple vent complex near Kawerau. The most likely scenarios for eruptions include hot pyroclastic flows, block and ash flows off the cone and light ashfalls. Hydrothermal eruptions could also be triggered in the nearby Kawerau Geothermal system. If lava flows are produced that flow off the cone they could extend into the Tarawera River, potentially damming the river or diverting its direction of flow.

White Island/Whaakari represents the summit of an active volcanic pile offshore from Whakatāne, however most of the eruptive impacts are confined to the island itself. Like Whakaari, impacts from a Mayor Island/Tūhua eruption impacts on the mainland are likely to be limited to ashfall in the coastal areas (1-20mm).
Figure 2.1: Hazards in and around the Bay of Plenty Region
Several active volcano systems exist in New Zealand outside of the Bay of Plenty. These primarily are the Kermadec’s (Raoul Island and many submarine volcanoes), Auckland Volcanic Field, Taupo Volcanic Centre, the Tongariro National Park volcanoes and Taranaki. These represent different levels of hazard to the BoP region, but primarily it is an ashfall hazard, ranging from a light dusting that creates visibility issues to thick falls that could collapse flat roofs. If sufficient ash falls there could be remobilisation of the ash into waterways, streams and rivers.

The factors relating to volcanic events which impact on evacuation eruption include:
- An eruption in the Auckland Volcanic Field could displace a large number of people into neighboring regions including the Bay of Plenty.
- There is usually some warning prior to a major eruption, between 1 day and 1 week for an Auckland field eruption, possibly much longer for central island eruptions, enabling more controlled evacuation.
- Lifeline utility services and transport routes are likely to be impacted.
- Volcanic ash can create hazardous driving conditions and increased vehicle breakdowns.

**EARTHQUAKES**

The Bay of Plenty is exposed to seismic hazards from three different sources. In the west is the ‘extensional western North Island faults’, covering most of the region is the ‘Taupō rift faults’, while to the east in the ‘North Island dextral’ fault belt. The Taupō rift fault is considered the most likely source of significant ground accelerations. The North Island dextral fault belt is likely to produce the largest events, but these are less frequent. Earthquakes from the extensional western North Island faults will be smaller than those from the dextral fault belt to the west, but again less frequent.

The factors relating to earthquakes which impact on evacuations include:
- They typically happen with little warning meaning evacuation is less able to be controlled and managed.
- Lifeline utility services and transport routes are likely to be impacted.
- Aftershocks and liquefaction could continue after the initial event resulting in more damage and uncertainty and prolonging the evacuation and shelter phase.

**TSUNAMI**

Tsunami can be generated from earthquakes, underwater landslides, large coastal cliff or lakeside landslides or underwater volcanic eruptions. The Bay of Plenty eastern coastline is at risk from tsunami.

The factors relating to tsunami which impact on evacuations include:
- Locally generated tsunami are likely to have very short warning times (compared to regional and distant tsunami which may have around 3 – 12 hours warning).
- Tsunami impacts can be widespread along the coast and devastating – many neighbouring regions may be using all their resources to manage their own issues and be unable to support Bay of Plenty.
- Some coastal towns in Bay of Plenty have constrained road network capacity to facilitate a rapid large scale evacuation from the area. ‘Seek high ground’ may be a better strategy than trying to move any distance.

**LANDSLIDES (INCLUDING DEBRIS FLOW AND SLUMPING)**

Much of the Bay of Plenty Region is vulnerable to landslide hazards triggered by both seismic and meteorological processes. While unlikely to occur on a scale requiring mass evacuation of areas landslides are likely to present significant barriers to evacuation by impacting on infrastructure networks. Most of the State Highways in the region are vulnerable at multiple points to landslides and would result in communities quickly becoming isolated. Similarly the rail network could easily become cut off for some time from even a relatively small landslide.
2.2 THE POPULATION

This section provides an overview of vulnerable groups in the region – those that have particular needs to be considered in evacuation and which may require additional time or resource to evacuate.

⇒ Specific information on location and numbers of people in these groups will be in local CDEM Evacuation plans.

The BoP CDEM Group Plan profiles the region’s population in Section 2.1 ‘Social Environment’. Figure 2.2 shows the region’s population centres. Key factors that may impact on evacuation processes include:

- There are a number of isolated communities, such as the small permanent population of Motiti Island, which are highly reliant on limited transport linkages.
- There are many iwi in the region, and also many associations with iwi from outside the region (particularly Aucklanders). There are over 120 marae in the Bay of Plenty and around 9 marae are located along the coast in tsunami risk areas (refer Figure 2.3).
- There are a large number of tourists and holiday homes which may be occupied by visitors unaware of the region’s hazards. Holiday homes may also become a destination for self-evacuation if a major disaster occurs in other population centres in the North Island.
- There is a large transitional / migrant population (eg: kiwifruit pickers) that are less likely to have support networks within the region.
- The capacity of temporary accommodation (hotels, motels etc) varies significantly according to the season.
- Cultural and linguistic diversity needs to be considered in dissemination of evacuation messages and be catered for in Civil Defence Centres (CDCs).
- The large farming industry faces additional challenges in managing animals in an evacuation.
- There are high levels of economic deprivation in some areas, particularly the Eastern Bay of Plenty, though conversely those people may in some ways be more resilient and self-sufficient.
- At any one time there could be up to three cruise ships in the Harbour, with up to 10,000 passengers and staff. If passengers are out on day trips they could potentially be isolated away from their ship accommodation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Approximate Numbers at Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eastern BoP</strong></td>
<td><strong>Western BoP</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds#</td>
<td>Whakatane Hospital 71 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opoiti Health Centre 6 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tauranga Hospital 285 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grace Hospital 50 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rotorua Hospital Bed Capacity of 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest home beds#</td>
<td>306 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1512 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>591 beds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Schools*</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Students*</td>
<td>9,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students Year 1-6*</td>
<td>4,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students Year 7-13*</td>
<td>5,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,072</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Hospital and rest home bed numbers provided by Lakes and BOP DHBs.
* School and student numbers based on Ministry of education figures for July 2013.

2.3 THE INFRASTRUCTURE

CRITICAL COMMUNITY FACILITIES

Figure 2.4 illustrates the major community facilities in the Bay of Plenty region. Each of these facilities is expected to have evacuation plans by the owning agency.

Figure 2.5 illustrates some key lifeline utilities in the Bay of Plenty region.
Population in and around Bay of Plenty

Figure 2.2: Populations in and around the Bay of Plenty Region (Stats NZ 2013).
Figure 2.3: Mare Locations in the Bay of Plenty Region
Figure 2.4: Community Infrastructure in the Bay of Plenty
**LIFELINES INFRASTRUCTURE**

The Bay of Plenty Engineering Lifelines Group *Utility Vulnerability Study Report* has information on critical infrastructure in the Bay of Plenty region, with key infrastructure shown in Figure 2.5. Some specific infrastructure constraints that may impact evacuation processes include:

- SH2, 30 and 35 have a large number of coastal bridges that could be impacted by tsunami / flood / storm surge (Figure 5.2).
- All of the State Highways have parts that are vulnerable to flooding and slipping to some extent. State Highway 2 and 35 running east to west across the Bay of Plenty cross most of the region’s major rivers at some point, and are most vulnerable to flood damage causing road closures for a period of time.
- Access to fuel (few fuel stations can pump without power)

There is also some significant infrastructure sites with widespread community impacts if they are evacuated. For example, the Port of Tauranga is, by cargo volume, the largest port in New Zealand and this is where the region’s fuel (and many other supplies) are brought in.

A more detailed lifelines vulnerability study is scheduled for 2014/15, which will enable a better understanding of these infrastructure constraints.

### 2.4 THE NEIGHBOURING REGIONS

Some of the factors that may impact on the ability of neighbouring regions to accommodate evacuees from Bay of Plenty (or conversely that may impact their ability to evacuate their own populations to Bay of Plenty) include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Regional Context</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>Many events could have multi-regional impacts which result in many regions being stretched to capacity managing their own response and evacuees and unable to offer support to other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a limited understanding of each region’s capacity to a) support evacuees, b) the likely timescales and numbers of people to evacuate under various hazards and c) understand the vulnerable groups in the region. All regions are currently underway or planning on doing further work in this area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>Accommodation is often at or near capacity during large events in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Road access to the region is limited – there are only two main roads north and one south so if these are impacted by the event there will be restricted access into/out of the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are many of their own regional hazards to deal with. Notably Mt Taranaki could cause evacuation of a large portion of New Plymouth and surrounding areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gisborne</td>
<td>Accommodation is often near or at capacity during summer months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure capacity is not sufficient for large additional numbers of people for an extended period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roads into and out of the region are vulnerable to floods/slips.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waikato</td>
<td>Waikato has some major CDCs at Claudelands and Mystery Creek.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There are a number of highways connecting the Bay of Plenty and Waikato regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawkes Bay</td>
<td>Accommodation is often near or at capacity in peak tourist season and during major events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The region has a major port and airport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manawatu-</td>
<td>Limited road access into/out of the region (SH1 &amp; SH3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanganui</td>
<td>One rail main trunk line through region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>The geography (narrow strip of land through the south), and subsequent network vulnerabilities limit the range of evacuation options and routes for the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A volcanic eruption could cause a major outflow of both voluntary and mandatory evacuees into other regions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Auckland has a much larger capacity than other regions to support evacuees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2.5: Lifeline Utility Infrastructure in the Bay of Plenty Region
3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The key responsibilities listed in this section have specific reference to responsibilities during the response phase of an evacuation. For a complete list of agency responsibilities refer to the Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan, 2011-2015.

3.1 ALL AGENCIES

Key Responsibilities

- Manage the response and restoration of services, while supporting and protecting the health and safety of staff.
- Coordinate with CDEM to provide information and advice relevant to their organisation / sector and to ensure the response is consistent with overall CDEM priorities and that public messaging is consistent.
- Coordinate with CDEM and other agencies to share resources, where practicable, and where this will improve the rate of overall community recovery.
- Deploy and manage support resources from unaffected areas, where practicable.

Limitations

- The type and scale of event will determine the availability of resources to manage the evacuation.
- All agencies need access to resources to support their own staff (food, shelter, transport).
- All agencies are dependent to some extent on other agencies and the ability to respond will be impacted by the status of these other agencies.

3.2 EMERGENCY SERVICES

NEW ZEALAND POLICE

Key Responsibilities

- Maintain law and order.
- Take all measures within their power and authority to protect life and property.
- Evacuate immediate disaster area (with the support of St John and Fire Service).
- Coordinate movement over land to assist the movement of rescue and other essential services.
- Assist with dissemination of warning messages.
- Provide security of evacuated areas, including the establishment of cordons.
- Trace missing persons and notify their next of kin.
- Assist the Coroner.
- Maintain a presence in the community to engender trust and confidence.
- Work with Road Authorities (NZTA and local authorities) in support of traffic management (noting that the first priority will be removing people from imminent danger).
- Provide Disaster Victim Identification and mortuary services.

NEW ZEALAND FIRE SERVICES

Key Responsibilities

- Coordinate fire and rescue response to affected areas.
- Containment of releases and spillages of hazardous substances.
- Command all urban search and rescue response activity.
- Evacuate people away from the immediate danger of the event (in liaison with St John and NZ Police).
- Contain immediate risks resulting from the event.
- Provide public fire safety messages (eg: turn off stove and gas).
- Decontamination of people affected by spillages or hazardous substances.

NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE

Key Responsibilities

- Provision of logistical resources that can support a disaster response including medical, transportation, health, catering, rescue.
Requests for support from the NZDF beyond local levels of commitment should be made through the National Controller in accordance with the agreement between MCDEM and the NZDF.

MINISTRY OF HEALTH – BAY OF PLENTY AND LAKES DISTRICT HEALTH BOARDS

Key Responsibilities
- Coordinate the provision of health services for patients that need medical care while maintaining a response capability for significant incidents and emergencies.
- Provide health related advice relevant to the response to the Public Information Manager (PIM).
- Encourage and support hospitals and health care providers have robust evacuation plans and access to resources to enable them to evacuate patients in danger.
- Support access to medication and medical treatment for evacuees.
- Provide details of neighboring medical services to CDCs.
- Assist Police with mortuary management.

Limitations
- In large scale events, elective surgery and out-patient services will be prioritised.
- Ability to move large groups of dependant parties in a timely manner.
- Ability to source essential resources such as food and clinical supplies.

ST JOHN AMBULANCE

Key Responsibilities
- Provide ambulance services to move vulnerable evacuees from the immediate disaster area and, if required, to other regions. Priority will be on evacuating acute care hospital patients.
- Support delivery of emergency medical support along evacuation route (and at CDCs, where practicable).

Limitations
- Reliance on a large number of volunteer staff.

3.3 WELFARE COORDINATING GROUP AGENCIES

Note: This Plan is based on the welfare roles and responsibilities that will take effect from January 2015.

The WCG is comprised of senior managers and support staff from central and local government, and non-government organisations who deliver welfare and health services in the Bay of Plenty region.

The WCG supports the delivery of welfare/wellbeing services by Territorial Authorities prior to, and during, an emergency event. The WCG ensures that welfare service delivery is pre-planned, organised, integrated, coordinated, and welfare agencies and bodies understand their role and responsibilities during a civil defence event.

It is noted that many of these agencies with a welfare support role have limited resources within the region and would be calling on national agency support in a major disaster.

CIVIL DEFENCE AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT GROUP

These actions are coordinated by the Welfare Coordination Group (WCG)
- Register people affected by an emergency; Supported by: District Health Boards, NZ Police, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) and NZ Red Cross.
- Coordinate Needs Assessments including: collating and analysing the welfare needs identified; and working with support agencies to identify and deliver appropriately integrated services and information to address welfare needs. Supported by: Ministry of Social Development (MSD), District Health Boards, St John, Victim Support, NZ Police, NZ Red Cross and Salvation Army.

1 The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2006, Section 6.1
• Plan for and co-ordinate the provision of household goods and services and other essential items to people who have been displaced or who are sheltering in place. **Supported by:** Local Authorities, NZ Red Cross, The Salvation Army, Ministry of Primary Industries (MPI), NZ Defence Force.

• Coordinate the provision of shelter and emergency accommodation (short term accommodation). **Supported by:** Housing New Zealand, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Social Development, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Te Punī Kōkiri (TPK)

**MINISTRY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (MSD)**

• Coordinate the provision of information on, and access to, the range of financial assistance available to people affected by an emergency. **Supported by:** Local Authorities, Inland Revenue, ACC, EQC, and Ministry for Primary Industries.

• Plan for the delivery and coordination of statutory care and protection services to those children and young people who have been identified (after registration) as being separated from their parents or normal guardians during an emergency. **Supported by:** Ministry of Education, NZ Police, NZ Red Cross, TPK and Victim Support.

**NZ POLICE**

• Coordinate the provision of an inquiry system is to allow responding agencies to identify people who have been affected by an emergency; and to assist family/whānau and friends to make contact with each other. **Supported by:** CDEM Group, Ministry of Health, MFAT, NZ Red Cross, and Ministry of Education.

**MINISTRY OF BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND EMPLOYMENT (MBIE)**

• Coordinate the provision of temporary accommodation for those people who cannot return to their homes for a prolonged period after an emergency event (this may be any period from weeks to months). **Supported by:** Housing New Zealand, District Health Board and Public Health Units, Local Authorities, commercial providers (eg rental companies), TPK, Ministry of Education, MSD, NZ Defence Force and the Salvation Army.

**MINISTRY OF PRIMARY INDUSTRIES (MPI)**

• Coordinate the provision of the animal welfare (including rescue, shelter, food, water, husbandry and veterinary care and other essentials) for all animals, including but not limited to, companion animals, production animals, animals in research, testing, and teaching facilities, zoo and circus animals, and wildlife. **Supported by:** Federated Farmers of New Zealand, SPCA, NZ Companion Animal Council, NZ Veterinary Association and Public Health Statutory Officers.

**BAY OF PLENTY AND LAKES DISTRICT HEALTH BOARDS**

• Coordinate the provision of psychosocial support services. DHBs advise non-government organisations and Primary Health Organisations on the type and nature of services needed for on-going psychosocial support. **Supported by:** Primary health organisations, MSD, Victim Support, TPK, The Salvation Army, NZ Red Cross, Ministry of Education, MPI and community based organisations and networks.

**DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS – COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS BAY OF PLENTY DISTRICT**

• Coordinate, manage and monitor the movement of offenders within, into and out of the Bay of Plenty Region. The Bay of Plenty does not have any residential correctional facilities but does have a significant number of the population on electronically monitored sentences. Corrections identify and monitor high risk offenders that are not suitable to be accommodated with the larger population in Civil Defence Centres and work with supporting agencies to ensure their welfare needs are met while keeping the community safe. Corrections are able to support the DHBs in providing psychologists and experienced staff to assist in the delivery of psychosocial support. Corrections can also offer a range of support to other agencies including labour force and access to its fleet of vehicles.
3.4 Lifelines

New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA)

Key Responsibilities
- Manage state highways (other roads are the responsibility of TLAs) including traffic management.
- Liaise with TLAs and NZ Police over traffic management.
- Advise CDEM Group on the traffic management plan.
- Identify alternative routes for event in consultation with TLAs and NZ Police.

Limitations
- Sufficient contractors available for traffic management (however would support with contracting resources from other unaffected areas).

All Lifelines

Key Responsibilities
- Restore services as quickly as possible, with consideration of CDEM priorities for service restoration such as emergency operating centres, critical sites of other lifelines and critical community sites.

3.5 CDEM Group

Key Responsibilities (coordinated through the ECC)
- Monitor events and issue regional warnings.
- Provide response coordination support between local and group CDEM and MCDEM.
- Support local EOCs.
- Provide assistance to other CDEM Groups as required.
- Coordinate agencies in support of evacuation.
- Coordinate and acquire resources as requested by EOC.
- Coordinate the sharing of information about the number of evacuees expected to evacuate
- Coordinate the movement of evacuees within the Bay of Plenty Group and maintain an overview of evacuees moving into or beyond the borders of the Bay of Plenty Group. (Noting that the coordination of the movement of evacuees between CDEM Groups is likely to be managed by the NCMC).
- Assess the effect on infrastructure that could worsen the disaster or affect the evacuation process

3.6 Territorial Local Authorities

Key Responsibilities – CDEM (coordinated through the EOC)
- Monitor events and issue warnings to local communities.
- Assess local response resources required for emergencies and activate those resources.
- Provide response coordination for local emergencies within TLA boundaries.
- Provide response support and assistance to the Bay of Plenty CDEMG and other CDEMGs as required.
- Welfare provision, as per Section 3.3.
- Assess the effect on local infrastructure that could worsen the disaster or affect the evacuation process.

Key Responsibilities - Road
- Manage local roads, including traffic management.
- Alternative route planning in consultation with NZTA, the Group LUC and NZ Police.
- Advise Controller on the traffic management plan.
4. EVACUATION DECISION

4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EVACUATION DECISION PHASE

The Evacuation Decision Phase runs from when an actual or potential need for evacuation is identified through to the decision as to whether evacuation or shelter-in-place is the preferred option. Figure 4-1 outlines the broad process in making the evacuation decision.

If a decision is made to activate the GECC to monitor or manage a potential evacuation with CDEM Group as lead agency, agencies will take the following actions during the Evacuation Decision phase (step 4 below).

Figure 4.1: Process for Decision to Evacuation

Table 4.1: Agency Actions in the Decision to Evacuate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All key agencies</td>
<td>- Assess actual/potential impact on own organisations and advise CDEM Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prepare to activate crisis management structures and deploy resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establish CDEM ECC and EOC liaison in accordance with CDEM plans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Agencies</td>
<td>- Provision of prompt and accurate information related to the hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoP Hazards</td>
<td>- Analysis of hazard information and advice on hazard threat to the CDEM Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDEM Group / ECC</td>
<td>- Activate ECC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Liaise with key agencies (eg: Emergency Services, BoP Hazards, Local EOCs) to establish scale and collate and analyse information (typically via conference call).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Notify all agencies (defined in section 3) of decision pending and to be on standby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Decide whether to order an evacuation or advise people to shelter-in-place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local EOC</td>
<td>- Activate local EOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Gather and provide information to CDEM Group on size and scale of event, threat to life, potential evacuee numbers and other factors effecting the decision to evacuate (refer Section 4.4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>- Provide information to the CDEM Group on risk / threat assessment to the public and to Emergency Services staff in managing an evacuation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.2 Confirm Lead Agency

The lead agency in an emergency response is the agency that has the legislative or agreed authority for control of the incident or emergency. Legislative powers to lead response activities are provided as follows:

- CDEM – all hazards.
- New Zealand Fire Services – fires and hazardous substances, urban search and rescue.
- Rural Fire Authorities - rural fires.
- New Zealand Police – deaths, criminal activities and to maintain public order.
- Ministry of Health – controlling infectious diseases.

If a declaration is made (as per section 4.3) the Controller becomes responsible for coordinating the event with the support of the original Lead Agency.

4.3 Determine Declaration Level

Authority to Declare

Prior to a declaration of emergency:

- NZ Police (under Common Law) have the legal authority to order an evacuation and use reasonable force as necessary. However, this only applies when danger is imminent; People cannot be ordered to move as a precaution if danger is expected (as per NZ Police Operating Procedures).
- The New Zealand Fire Service is similarly able to order an evacuation if life or property is in danger.
- Medical Officer of health – if required to protect public health.

Following a declaration of a state of emergency:

- The Police or a CDEM Controller (CDEM Act 2002, Section 86) may authorise the evacuation and exclusion from any premises or place. This can be affected pre- or post-event.

Type of Declaration

No Declaration

- Emergency services are the lead agency in managing local immediate evacuations where they are within the capabilities of the local emergency services and other supporting agencies.
- EOC is in support and monitoring role at the appropriate level.

Local Declaration

- Event is contained within the EOC jurisdiction and support is not required from outside the area.
- Emergency services are able to support EOC with the evacuation under local declaration.
- Bay of Plenty ECC is in supporting and monitoring role.

Local Declaration (Group-wide)

- EOC and/or capacity of local area is overwhelmed and unable to cope with evacuation.
- Group coordination will improve response and evacuation is within the capabilities of the ECC.
- Emergency services are able to coordinate regional supported evacuation under declaration.
- NCMC is in supporting and monitoring role.

National Declaration (Needs to be requested NCMC)

- Bay of Plenty GEC is overwhelmed and unable to cope with evacuation with regional resources.
- Multi regional event or nationally significant event.
- NCMC coordinates the support from neighbouring regions and countries.

Key Terms:

A state of emergency is a government declaration that may suspend some normal functions of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, alert citizens to change their normal behaviours, or order government agencies to implement emergency preparedness plans. Such declarations usually come during a time of natural or man-made disaster, during periods of civil unrest, or following a declaration of war or situation of international or internal armed conflict.

Mandatory evacuation is where residents are directed to leave because it is believed that the risk is too great to allow them to remain where they are.

Vertical evacuation is evacuation to a higher floor or roof of a building.

Voluntary evacuees are those that leave their current location because of actual or perceived risk without being directed to do so.
Emergency Services are able to coordinate NZ-wide supported evacuation under National declaration.

⇒ Further guidance on the Declaration Decision and Lead Agency Roles are in the Bay of Plenty CDEMG Plan, Section 5.

### 4.4 Decision To Evacuate

Mandatory evacuation places a great demand on resources and a duty of responsibility on authorities to ensure that people who are evacuated are cared for. However people left to shelter-in-place may be at direct risk from the hazard or longer term risk of living in unsafe or unsanitary properties.

The over-riding principle in deciding to evacuate is whether a mandatory evacuation is considered to provide less risk to public health and safety than sheltering in place.

However there are no specific rules as to when to order a mandatory evacuation and this Plan deliberately leaves the parameters flexible to allow the Group Controller to consider the unique circumstances of the event and make a decision based on the best information available.

The following factors may impact the decision over whether the risk of sheltering in place outweighs the risk of evacuation:

**Impact on Vulnerable Groups**

Some communities may be more difficult to evacuate or may be more vulnerable if sheltering-in-place. For example, the difficulties and risks associated with evacuating a prison or intensive care hospital may affect the decision as to whether evacuation or shelter-in-place provides the least risk to occupants and others. Consideration also needs to be given to the mixing of the general population with some of these special groups.

⇒ Section 2.2 outlines the vulnerable groups in the Bay of Plenty region that should be considered.

**Time Available**

The time available will determine whether immediate evacuation is required or if a staged evacuation is a more suitable option. Consider:

- Most populated areas need 1-4 hours to effect a managed evacuation from the area (depending on size), though more prepared communities such as those with neighbourhood response plans may be able to evacuate more quickly.
- If there is less than an hour’s warning, people might be more at-risk of getting stuck in traffic congestion if access roads are restricted.
- A storm surge, flood or tsunami with very short warning times may suggest a ‘vertical evacuation’ is the safest option.
- If there is more than 4 hours warning a staged evacuation (zone by zone) may prevent serious traffic congestion impeding the evacuation. While compliance with staged evacuation directions may not be high, they can improve the flow of traffic.

**Availability of Transport and Transport Routes**

Shelter-in-place may be preferred if there has been a significant disruption to transport and/or where driving conditions are assessed as risky. Evacuation routes may be gridlocked, damaged or unsafe due to the hazard.
Planning Expectations

To enable the effective implementation of the ‘Evacuation Decision’ Phase, the following is required:

1. **All agencies** shall have operational plans that enable them to undertake the actions described in Section 4.1.

2. **Local CDEM Evacuation plans** shall provide the detail that supports this section at a local level. This should include:
   - Hazard analysis to identify the potential impacts and numbers of evacuees hazard scenarios in each town (may be part of neighbourhood response planning).
   - Pre-determined evacuation triggers for the hazards that provide a risk to their areas. These may include river or flood levels at certain locations, tsunami evacuation areas for different threat sizes (e.g., expected wave heights), evacuation areas for different volcanic hazard threat levels, etc.
   - Necessary warning times to evacuate areas, as this will impact on how long a decision can be left before the expected hazard arrives.
   - Specific locations and types of vulnerable groups and the level of preparedness (and level of support required to evacuate).
   - Identification of infrastructure constraints that may impede or direct evacuation from each town / area.

3. **Bay of Plenty Regional Council** shall provide hazard information to support the above analysis.
5. EVACUATION PLANNING AND WARNING

5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EVACUATION PLANNING AND WARNING PHASE

The Planning and Warning Phase covers the period of time from when the decision to evacuate has been made through to the issuing of the initial public messages to evacuate (noting that public messaging will evolve and continue through the evacuation phase as well).

Figure 5.1 outlines the Planning and Warning process. Table 5.1 summarises the agency actions to be taken (under the overall coordination of the ECC) during this phase. This assumes that a decision has been made to activate the ECC to monitor or coordinate a potential evacuation with CDEM as lead agency.

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**Key Terms:**

**Evacuation Assembly Areas:** Pre-determined site outside of the impacted area established as an assembly area for evacuees en-route to a destination.

**Staging Areas:** Pre-determined site outside of the impacted area established to stage and coordinate transportation resources in support of pick-up point operations.

**Rest Areas:** Areas evacuees can be diverted to if traffic becomes overly congested.

---

Figure 5.1: Process for Evacuation Warning and Planning

Table 5.1: Roles and Actions During the Planning and Warning Phase

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All key agencies</td>
<td>• Assess impact on own infrastructure/organisations and advise Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Activate crisis management structures and evacuation plans – deploy resources with consideration of risk to personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CDEM Group      | • Activate ECC (if not already).                                                                                                        |
|                 | • Advise key agencies of decision to evacuate (section 5.2).                                                                          |
|                 | • Liaise with neighbouring Groups and NCMC about ability to receive and support evacuees and make formal request to direct evacuees to regions (if applicable). |
|                 | • Coordinate the development of the initial Group Evacuation Incident Action Plan (IAP).                                                  |
|                 | • Activate the WCG to coordinate and support welfare resources required across the region and cross regional evacuee support requirements. |
|                 | • Liaise with other key agencies to develop public messaging and coordination / disseminate public information,                        |
|                 | • Liaise with other agencies to establish a facility to handle public inquiries.                                                          |
|                 | • Regional coordination of staging and assembly areas, registration centres.                                                            |
|                 | • Coordination of available buses and/or drivers from neighbouring TLAs and regions.                                                     |
### Agency Actions

**Local EOC**
- Activate local EOC (if not already).
- Continue to update and provide information to CDEM Group on numbers and types of evacuees, preferred evacuation routes, public transport resources and other factors affecting the evacuation process (refer Section 5.2).
- Assist Emergency Services with local messaging, if required (eg: door knocking).
- Activate the WCG to coordinate and support welfare resources within the District.
- Local planning for staging and assembly areas, registration centres.

**Police, supported by Fire**
- Assist people requiring support in evacuating from area.
- Local messaging (door knocking, loud hailer), if time.
- Prepare to secure evacuated area and procure security arrangements.

**NZDF**
- Where possible provide personnel to support with public messaging via NCMC.

**DHB**
- Provide health related messages to PIM and public.

**Bus / Rail**
- Liaise with Local Controller/EOC on the availability of resources.

**Neighbouring Groups**
- Support with public messaging in own regions.

**Road Authorities**
- Provide advice on suitable evacuation routes, traffic management mechanisms and requirement for rest areas.
- Deploy traffic management resources.

### 5.2 PLAN THE EVACUATION

Where time permits, evacuation should be undertaken in a controlled manner with designated evacuation routes and CDCs established. This will enable tracking of numbers and registration and receipt of evacuees to be better managed with resources placed to support evacuees.

Also, where time permits, the following planning should be undertaken before the evacuation:
- Preferred evacuation routes (and alternates if these become damaged/congested).
- Timing issues (warning required to safely evacuate an area, where the hazard is imminent).
- Location of staging areas, assembly areas, temporary rest areas, registration centres and CDCs.
- Public transport available/required to support the evacuation.
- Traffic management arrangements (signage, road closures/diversions)

In making these decisions, the following factors should be considered:

1. **Early Advice to Key Stakeholders:** Those that need to support the evacuation and mobilise resources (Emergency Services, Transport Agencies, Neighbouring Groups, WCG agencies) and those that have special considerations and may take longer to evacuate (complex infrastructure sites, hospitals, prisons). Figure 5.4 illustrates how these stakeholders will be communicated with.

2. **Time of the day:** Warning people during the night will be more challenging than during the day and an initial decision to shelter-in-place under darkness and then evacuate at first light could be an option, if time permits.

3. **Preferred Evacuation routes,** considering:
   - Ability to resupply fuel along evacuation route.
   - Traffic flow capacity.
   - Ability to recover/remove broken down vehicles and responds to accidents and emergencies.
   - Access to the evacuation area and collection points.
   - Route destination to safe areas that can cope with a large number of evacuees.
   - Route safety / vulnerability of the route to hazards.
   - Network of routes feeding into and out of evacuation routes.
   - The ability to provide rest areas along route.

Figure 5.2 shows the significant road hazards in the Bay of Plenty region and Figure 5.3 illustrates detour routes for key roads that are vulnerable to closure.
Figure 5.2: Major Road Hazards
Figure 5.3: Major Road Detour Routes and Times
4. **Evacuation Timing and Areas**: Where there is uncertainty as to the impact or extent of the hazard, and there is some warning time for this to be further assessed, CDEM agencies may decide to wait for further information before making a decision.

5. **The Number and Type of Evacuees**: Consider the likely evacuation timeframes and support requirements for vulnerable groups, seasonal populations, any major events and the extent of self-evacuation that might be occurring (effective public management can minimise the risk of unnecessary evacuation, however these evacuees may still need to be supported if they ignore this advice).

6. **Safety of Staff supporting the evacuation**: Consider the risk to emergency workers supporting the evacuation process.

7. **Public Transport Resources**: Required to support the evacuation, considering factors such as the logistics of deploying buses to assembly areas, appropriate pick up points.

   ⇒ Section 6.3 details how public transport resources will be managed during the Evacuation Process.

8. **Location of Staging Areas, Assembly Areas, Rest Areas and Registration Centres**: Considering numbers and types of evacuees and level of support requirements.

   ⇒ Section 7.2 covers in more detail the selection of Registration and CDC sites.

9. **Lifeline Utility Considerations**: Including:
   - Availability of fuel supply along the evacuation routes, particularly for emergency services, rescue vehicles and other critical community agencies, and to minimise ‘empty tank’ breakdowns.
   - If power is out, traffic signals and railway crossing lights will not function and manual traffic control would be necessary – therefore routes that still have power supply are preferred.
   - Traffic bottlenecks should be avoided – eg: road obstructions/closures due to flooding/damage, dual carriageways merging, major intersections.

**5.3 DEVELOP KEY MESSAGES**

Consistent messaging is critical. It is important that Public Information Managers (PIMs) at national, regional and local level work together with all supporting agencies to get messaging out to effected people that are timely, accurate and clearly understood by all. In general, the lead agency should determine the public information to be released and other agencies should support with the dissemination of the agreed messages.

The public messages should cover the following, and be updated as the situation develops:

- **Why to evacuate** (hazard and risk information – without clear, compelling reasons people may ignore the evacuation or there may be unnecessary voluntary evacuees).
- **What areas to evacuate** (and where it is safer to shelter-in-place).
- **When to evacuate** (if there is plenty of warning time, a phased evacuation can help manage traffic congestion and more effective registration of evacuees).
- **What to take with you** (eg essential supplies, medications, documentation)
- **What to do before you leave** (eg: turn off power, water and natural gas supplies, managing live stock, domestic animals and pets, protect water supply/electrical equipment from ash).
- **How to evacuate** (how to signal need for assistance, warnings about hazards, fill fuel tanks, what to do if you break down, where to go if you have no transport, when it is safer to evacuate by foot than by vehicle)
- **Where to evacuate** (preferred evacuation routes, status of transport route congestion and location of registration/evacuation/medical centres if not self-managing).
- **How to get information** (radio channels, internet, emergency telephone numbers, etc), including status of schools, essential services available and how you will be advised it is safe to return.
- **What not to do** (eg: requesting people not to use phone except in emergencies, don’t use 111 for emergency updates, hazardous areas to avoid, etc).
5.4 Communicated Key Messages

Coordination of Public Communication Between CDEM Groups

In an event where the regions need PIM support during a civil defence emergency, a Public Information agreement is being developed for mutual support between the Bay of Plenty, Northland, Waikato and Auckland depending on the availability of staff and the nature of the request.

⇒ (Bay of Plenty CDEM Public Information Management Plan – August 2011)

Communication Lines

Figure 5.4 illustrates the primary lines through which key messages are disseminated to key stakeholders and the public.

Communication Methods

There are a wide range of warning methods available, including:

- Door to door knocking
- Media (including social media such as twitter)
- Helplines/ call centres
- CDEM websites
- Mobile loudhailer
- Signage on roads - motorways.
- Txt message

Of critical importance is that multiple and repeated methods are used. Further guidance on methods and standard messaging templates are contained in Group and Local PIM Plans.

Figure 5.4: Communication Lines for Dissemination of Messaging

Note: This figure does not show all communication lines, for simplicity. For example the Group PIM will also be liaising with other agencies such as NZTA to ensure consistent traffic management.
messages. Many agencies such as Welfare agencies, DHB and Emergency Services will have liaison at local, group and national level.

### Planning Expectations

To enable effective implementation of the Planning and Warning Phase:

1. **All agencies** will have evacuation plans for their own facilities / organisations, and business continuity plans to ensure that they can continue to provide a service outside evacuated areas.
2. **Road Authorities** will work together to establish integrated and pre tested traffic control management plans that identify:
   - preferred and alternative evacuation routes for different scenarios
   - capacity of those routes
   - road closures/diversions
   - areas where contra flows may be used and how these will be implemented, and
   - signage requirements.
3. **Local CDEM Evacuation Plans** will provide detailed information on:
   - which warning methods will be used in different scenarios
   - pre-prepared messages for local messaging.
   - evacuation zones for different hazards (eg: flood, tsunami threat levels).
4. The **Group PIM** will have pre-prepared messages and media release templates for Group messages and pre-determined methods for releasing messages in different scenarios.
5. **Emergency Services** will have plans to support local community messaging.
6. EVACUATION PHASE

6.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EVACUATION PROCESS

The Evacuation Phase runs from when the order is first given to evacuate an area until all people have left the area where a mandatory evacuation is in place.

This section covers:
- Traffic management processes
- Management of public transport resources
- Security of evacuated areas.
- Monitoring and supporting vehicles along evacuation routes.

It is critical that organisation’s operational plans include the concept of scalability. As the evacuation size increases, normal operational procedures will not necessarily apply. As an example, organisational planning must articulate how evacuation routes will be kept clear if land vehicles are unable to gain access to broken down cars (e.g., would air support be required to remove them).

Key Terms:
- **Self-evacuees** are those that can leave their current location via their own means of transport such as a personal car, bike or other vehicle.
- **Assisted-evacuees** are those that do not have their own, or access to a, vehicle and therefore need assistance in the form of transport organised as part of the emergency response.

Figure 6.1: Evacuation Process

*Note ‘traffic management’ includes management of vehicular, foot and cycle traffic.*

6.2 TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT

**KEY ACTIONS**

During the *Planning and Warning* phase (Section 5), preferred and alternate routes will have been determined and traffic management mechanisms (signage, diversions, contra flows, etc) will have been identified and deployed. Once the evacuation is underway, Table 6.1 details the actions that will be taken by each organisation to manage traffic flows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Key Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All agencies</td>
<td>• Evacuating facilities, Tracking own staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sitreps to Controllers – impact assessments, support requirements, potential issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group ECC</td>
<td>• Coordinate information from involved agencies and keep NCMC informed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continuously monitor, update and implement Group IAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support local EOC in evacuation operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local EOC</td>
<td>• Monitor and report evacuation numbers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobilise CDC resources (refer section 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate public transport resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDEM</td>
<td>• Ongoing monitoring, government reporting, coordination of assistance, public assurance and forecasting of issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Traffic Management Actions and Roles
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Key Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>• Assist evacuation of vulnerable groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| NZ Police           | • Immediate road closures required to ensure safety.  
• Evacuation of people away from the immediate danger area.  
• Traffic Management in support of Road Authorities if required (where resources permit).  
• Advising CDEM of public transport requirements to support populations in area. |
| NZTA                | • State Highway traffic management.  
• Advise Controllers on road conditions, alternative routes and contra flow options.  
• NZTAs Network Management Consultants will:  
  □ Act in advisory capacity to NZTA.  
  □ Task Maintenance Contractors on road closures and traffic management requirements.  
  □ Liaise will all Emergency Services and TLAs in managing road closures, evacuation routes and alternative routes.  
  □ Liaise with neighbouring NZTA regions and TLAs on the use of alternative routes.  
  □ Liaise with neighbouring regions on linking of roads into the neighbouring regions.  
• NZTA’s Highway Maintenance Contractor will:  
  □ Provide updates to Network Consultants on road conditions.  
  □ Undertake traffic management in consultation with Network Management Consultants. |
| Territorial Authority | • Local road traffic management (consultants engaged by TLAs to manage local roads will coordinate this).                                                                |
| BoP Regional Council | • Maintain a database of the bus company contacts 24/7 including drivers, bus capacity, bus locations day and night, existing MOUs with health Providers to assist with evacuations and fuel capacity. |

**COMMUNICATION LINES**

Figure 6.2 illustrates tasking and communication lines in relation to traffic management.

**6.3 COORDINATE PUBLIC TRANSPORT RESOURCES**

If it is determined appropriate to support the evacuation process with public transport (the decision having been made as per Section 5.2), these public transport resources shall be managed as follows.

---

2 NZ Police, Fire Service and NZTA all have legislative powers to close roads. Following a state of emergency, a CDEM Controller may authorise the exclusion of people from any place.
**BUSES**

Figure 6.3 illustrates tasking and communication lines in relation to bus coordination. Table 6.2 summarises the actions being undertaken by each organisation in coordinating bus transport.

It is noted that in principle, buses within the area of the Territorial Authorities are the resource of that area. However in a large scale evacuation with cross-boundary movement, the GECC will provide overall coordination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Key Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bus Companies</td>
<td>• Coordinate the availability of buses and drivers within their company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure drivers get enough rest and for their health and safety (breaks and roster systems).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaise with Local Controller/EOC on the continued availability of resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide buses and drivers as requested by Local Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Controller</td>
<td>• Provide advice to bus companies as to where buses are required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide advice to bus companies as to hazards impact, preferred evacuation routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay of Plenty Regional Council</td>
<td>• Policy and Transport provide advice on the most effective way of minimised buses and drivers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RAIL**

Figure 6.4 illustrates tasking and communication lines in relation to rail coordination.

Table 6.3 summarises the key actions being taken by each agency in the coordination of rail. The following principles are noted:

- A six car train set with passengers with no luggage can take up to 1000 people.
- The majority of the fleet is located in Auckland, using this fleet will have a major impact on Auckland transport (and question over whether engines can take trains over Bombay Hills).
Table 6.3: Rail Coordination Roles and Actions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Key Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDEM Group</td>
<td>• CDEM Group liaises with NCMC to request Rail Transport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• NCMC liaises with Transport Response Team (TRT).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KiwiRail Network Control Manager</td>
<td>• KiwiRail Network Control Manager activates the Joint Crisis Management Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Crisis Management Group</td>
<td>• Establish Group in Auckland or Wellington, to implement the Rail Crisis Management Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Advise NCMC on the Rail Crisis Management Plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordinate Rail Vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaise with Rail Incident Controller on resources requested on Group or Local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Incident Controller</td>
<td>• Support and advise either Group or Local Controller on the coordination of rail vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ensure that drivers get enough rest and for their health and safety (breaks / roster system are in place).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AIR

The main airports in the Bay of Plenty region include the following (also refer Figure 2-4):
- Rotorua (capacity for Airbus A32)
- Tauranga (capacity for Hercules)
- Whakatane

Air transport cannot evacuate large numbers of people quickly and is generally more important for bringing in logistical support and personnel than evacuating people. In an emergency where the NCMC is activated, the national Transport Response Team (convened by the Ministry of Transport) provides advice on transport related issues, recommendations for response and recovery priorities and collates action requests. There is an Air Operations position in the ECC which would coordinate regional air transport resources.

SEA TRANSPORT

Boats (naval and civil) and ferries could be used to transport people from Omokoroa, the Islands, to Tauranga and from Tauranga to Auckland and Napier.

6.4 MONITOR / SUPPORT ALONG EVACUATION ROUTES

DIVERSION TO REST AREAS

Evacuation of a large number of people in a short time may cause traffic congestion and, in the worst case, even gridlock. Diversion to rest areas is an option. Note that if people are being diverted off the road for any length of time, they will need to be supported with water, food and shelter.

FUEL SUPPLY

As discussed in ‘lifeline utility considerations’ (section 5.2), fuel will be a critical issue. In accordance with the National CDEM Fuel Plan and BoP Regional Fuel Contingency Plan, it is expected that:
- GECC will advise fuel companies the ‘CDEM critical fuel customers’ for priority fuel supply.
- Fuel companies will put in place procedures to ensure that these customers are able to access fuel. This may include designated lanes at services stations, designated services stations, or allowing ‘queue jumping’. (Forecourt control and security is the responsibility of the fuel station owners, however the Police may need to support if public safety is threatened).
- The GECC will advise fuel companies of any supply priorities or issues which need to be addressed.

SECURING EVACUATED AREAS
Visibly securing evacuation areas should provide public assurance that they can safely leave their homes. The NZ Police will be responsible for securing evacuated areas, supported by Fire and possibly NZDF in a major event. The NZ Police will take any immediate steps to protect life and property and will further liaise with the Group and Local Controllers over the extent of the area to be secured.

**ACCESS FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES AND OTHER KEY AGENCIES**

Preferred evacuation routes will have traffic shoulders, which should to be kept clear for emergency services, break down trucks and critical lifelines such as fuel trucks. It may be necessary to have plans to forcibly remove broken down or crashed vehicles. Consider deploying loaders along shoulders for this purpose.

Table 6.4: Agency Roles and Actions in Providing Support along Evacuation Routes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency/Role</th>
<th>Key Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road Authorities</td>
<td>• Identify the need for, and location of, rest areas along route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide traffic management support to rest areas, staging areas and evacuation assembly areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group ECC</td>
<td>• Advise fuel companies of local evacuation routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaise with agencies to ensure that sufficient support is in place along route.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide oversight of evolving issues and communicate to local EOCs to address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communicate priorities for fuel supply to fuel companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local EOC</td>
<td>• Liaise with Road Authorities and provide logistical / welfare support at areas where people have been directed to rest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDEM</td>
<td>• Ongoing monitoring, government reporting, coordination of assistance, public assurance and forecasting of issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Police</td>
<td>• Maintain law and order during evacuation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Secure evacuated areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WCG</td>
<td>• Coordinate and provide support and assistance at rest areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel Companies</td>
<td>• Put in place mechanisms to ensure critical customers ensure continuity of supply.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Take all practicable measures to keep fuel stations supplied with fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaise with CDEM Controllers re: actions being taken and receive priority directives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Advise ECC of re-supply problems.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Planning Expectations**

To enable effective implementation of the Evacuation phase:

1. **Road Authorities** will have tested traffic control management plans that identify preferred and alternative evacuation routes for different scenarios, road closures/diversions and signage requirements.

2. **Local CDEM Evacuation Plans** will contain processes for:
   - maintaining relationships and communications with public transport agencies and databases of resources available.
   - in liaison with Road Authorities, identify potential traffic bottlenecks and potential rest/shelter areas along key routes for diversion of traffic.

3. **Fuel companies** will:
   - have plans in place to ensure continuous supply to GECC named CDEM-critical customers and to keep fuel stations on evacuation routes supplied as far as practicable.
   - Assist the CDEM Group to review business continuity planning such as power backup at key fuel stations.

4. **NZ Police** will maintain plans and procedures for:
   - assisting with warnings and evacuation
   - securing evacuated areas
   - maintaining traffic flows along evacuation routes, including special measures for removing broken down vehicles.
5. **Key Agencies** with vulnerable client organisations (Ministry of Education, Ministry of Health, Department of Corrections) shall support client organisations to have detailed evacuation plans in place and support them to do so.

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### 7. Shelter

#### 7.1 Overview of the Shelter Phase

The shelter phase includes the receiving, registration and temporary accommodation of evacuees. It requires coordination amongst a number of government, CDEM and welfare delivery agencies.

Welfare response at the Group level is coordinated by the Group Welfare Manager with multi agency advice, support and coordination of welfare activities by the WCG. Membership is drawn from all key welfare organisations within the group.

In smaller evacuations, people often seek shelter in second homes, hotel/motels or with family/friends before seeking public shelter. In larger scale evacuations, these alternatives may not be available. Therefore local CDEM Evacuation Plans need to detail how people can be accommodated in public shelter areas (CDCs). Arrangements also need to be made to track and connect individuals and families.

#### 7.2 Identifying Civil Defence Centres

**CDC Capacity in / near Bay of Plenty**

Bay of Plenty has an estimated capacity to shelter around 23,000 evacuees in CDCs within the region (while noting there are likely to be capacity restraints in terms of staff and logistics to open all the centres at once) as follows:

- Approximately 9,000 capacity in Western Bay of Plenty, the largest CDCs at Bay Park Stadium & TECT Arena with capacity for around 2000 people each.
- Approximately 8,800 capacity in Eastern Bay of Plenty, the largest sites having no more than 600 people capacity.
- Approximately 5,300 in Rotorua, the largest site being the Energy Centre with around 1,500 person capacity.

---

3 This is intended to provide a broad picture of regional capacity. Seasonal variations will occur. Details of welfare centre sites and capacity will be held in local CDEM Evacuation Plans.
Table 7.1: Key Roles and Actions during the Shelter Phase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Territorial Authority** | • Coordinate and ensure trained staff capability for EOC.  
• Coordinate the staffing of CDCs.  
• Have emergency Finance process in place to support EOC.                                                                 |
| **Local EOCs**          | • Activate appropriate CDCs.  
• Support logistically activated CDCs.  
• Activate agencies to provide welfare services (e.g., receive and register evacuees).  
• Engage with agencies to provide support.  
• Monitor shelter locations security, food, bedding, clothing.  
• Coordinate emergency temporary accommodation.  
• Plan for return.                                                                 |
| **Local Welfare Manager** | • Convenes the Local Welfare Committee when appropriate.  
• Seeks to understand the needs of the local environment/community, particularly the vulnerable and those at risk.  
• Coordinates and supports CDCs.  
• Liaise with Group Welfare Manager.                                                                 |
| **Local Welfare Committee** | • Advises Local Controller/EOC via Local Welfare Manager on the operational welfare plan capability.  
• Manage issues for welfare operations.                                                                 |
| **GECC**                | • Monitor situation, identify medium / long term issues, and collateSitreps and IAPs.  
• Support local EOC operations as required.  
• Support welfare action planning.                                                                 |
| **Welfare Manager**     | • Advise the CDEM Group Controller on welfare matters.  
• Liaise with and support Local Welfare Managers on the provision of welfare services within their territorial authority and support where necessary.  
• Resolve issues of coordination between welfare agencies that cannot be resolved at the local level.  
• Coordinate the development of emergency welfare programmes and tasks in GECC IAPs. |
| **Welfare Coordinating Group** | • Advises Group Controller/GECC via Group Welfare Manager on the Group welfare plan capability.  
• Manage issues for coordination of welfare by agencies.                                                                 |
| **MCDEM/NWCG**          | • Ongoing monitoring, government reporting, coordination of assistance, public assurance and forecasting of issues (depending on mode of activation). |
| **Fire Service**         | • Fire safety and other personnel support at CDCs.  
• Assist with water for drinking / cleaning at CDCs (likely to be supported by other tanker-owning companies such as breweries).  
• Assist with transportation of vulnerable populations.                                                                 |
| **St John**             | • Provide healthcare at shelter facilities (if required).  
• Transportation of vulnerable populations.                                                                 |
<p>| <strong>Police</strong>              | • Disaster Victim Identification.                                                                                                      |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reassurance patrolling around CDCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Presence at major CDCs during reconciliation / inquiry phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHB</td>
<td>• Provide details of neighbouring medical services to CDCs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Psychosocial support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSD</td>
<td>• Provide emergency payments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide personnel to support CDC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Red Cross</td>
<td>• Provision of CDC management services and first aid support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide staff/volunteers for welfare/outreach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National NECC established to coordinate logistics / command through a local Red Cross EOC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Plus other roles as defined in section 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>• CDC support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Pastoral Care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision and coordination of Salvation Army volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Plus other roles as defined in section 3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPI</td>
<td>• Establish temporary shelters for animals – racecourse, tennis courts, schools, parks, other ‘animal housing’ facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Support Trust</td>
<td>• Provide communication between those able to provide specialized rural support outcomes and those requiring those outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Moral support for displaced rural people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Corrections, Health</td>
<td>• Liaise with ‘client’ agencies and ensuring alternative facilities available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prepare a controlled return plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifeline Utilities</td>
<td>• Continued capacity support in evacuation / shelter.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neighbouring regions (with the same proviso as for Bay of Plenty – refer footnote previous page) have an estimated capacity to shelter evacuees as follows:

- Auckland – has around 130 designated facilities with capacity for up to 50,000 evacuees in terms of physical space – however they do not currently (April 2012) have sufficient staff to run this number of facilities concurrently and would need outside assistance. Additionally, in Auckland there are a large number of corporate accommodation facilities.

- Waikato has an estimated capacity to shelter around 50,000-60,000 evacuees in CDCs within the region. Major sites at Claudelands and Mystery Creek could accommodate around 10,000 evacuees (with the potential to expand to 35,000 at Mystery Creek).

- Taranaki. Could shelter around 5,000 in CDCs and 5,000 in corporate accommodation (unless major event is being hosted in the region).

- Gisborne. Could shelter 2,000 from outside region (if scenario does not affect the region) – this number could increase if marae arrangements activated. Larger numbers could be accommodated for short periods, eg: using the region as a staging area with temporary accommodation such as camping.

- Hawkes Bay. Could shelter around 7,000 in various accommodation facilities (4000 beds in motels/hotels plus other sites such as marae, hostels).

- Manawatu-Wanganui could shelter around 4,000 in CDCs and about the same amount in corporate accommodation.

Other potential accommodation includes:

- Housing NZ (generally have around 3-5% unoccupied, though some of these are unfurnished and unsuitable for occupation). HNZ first priority will be re-housing their own tenants.

**SELECTING CIVIL DEFENCE CENTRES**
CDCs should be established in accordance with international standards\textsuperscript{4}. It is recognised that many proposed CDC sites do not currently meet these standards, and as part of local evacuation / welfare planning, the appropriate standard will be reviewed.

The following criteria should be considered before confirming appropriate welfare sites for the event:

- The numbers expected (if small, it may be cheaper and simpler to accommodate in hotels/motels).
- The ability to cater for the needs of vulnerable groups (refer Section 2.2), such as pet owners, culturally and linguistically diverse and physically/mentally impaired. This will require provision of resources such as disabled access, temporary animal shelters, translators, special food requirements, etc. (It is likely that only some centres will be equipped to deal with all these issues and people that have these special requirements may need to be moved to between Centres).
- The ability to source food in the area (ie impact of the event of Fast Moving Consumer Goods to the area).
- Provision of safe sleeping and play areas for children
- Safe storage for medications
- The ability to separate and manage special needs evacuees such as criminals and mentally handicapped people.
- Access to sites for refueling and parking and public transport.
- Designated CDC facilities as a first priority (where agreements are in place)
- Availability of medical support (note that St John is unlikely to have the resource to support all CDCs and CDCs should hold details of nearby medical centres to refer people to).
- Seasonal impact – weather conditions, tourism peaks.
- Separation of Evacuation and Recovery Centres (which provides better logistical coordination at centres).

Organised billeting will not be used as an accommodation strategy, due to the complex issues around ensuring safety of hosts and billets. Voluntary billeting (people staying with friends and family) will be encouraged.

\section*{7.3 Registering Evacuees}

The responsibility for registering evacuees lies with CDEM, the Red Cross have a mandate to assist CDEM through the National CDEM Plan to carry out this activity.

Within the region, registration centres will be placed along key routes away from the evacuation area (these may also be rest / support areas as described in Section 6.4). If evacuees are being directed to other regions (in agreement with those Groups), the most likely reception points are as follows:

- Hawkes Bay: Reception areas on main access points SH2 / SH5.
- Taranaki: New Plymouth (preferred location) followed by Harewa or Stratford.
- Waikato: Claudelands Event Centre.
- Gisborne: Lawson Field Theatre.
- Auckland: Reception centre would be established from a range of predetermined locations depending on requirements specific to the event.

Registration points should:

- Give priority to registering people that need assistance.
- Emphasise the need for people to know their registration number to assist accessing CDCs.
- Assisting with enquiries to locate family members
- If a territorial authority has exhausted its efforts to locate family members, direct people to a Red Cross helpline to find out if these people have been registered.

Planning Expectations

To enable effective implementation of the Shelter Phase, all agencies will have plans in place to deliver their roles details in Table 7-1, notably:

1. Local CDEM Plans will have identified preferred CDCs and ensure they meet appropriate standards.
2. Group CDEM will have plans to support EOAs and liaise with the National Welfare Coordination Group.
3. WCG will develop and foster relationships amongst welfare agencies.
4. Welfare Agencies will have plans to mobilise resources to manage and support CDCs.
8. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

8.1 PLAN REVIEW PROCESS

The Group is responsible for maintaining arrangements to ensure that this Plan is effectively exercised to ensure it is current and people are familiar with processes. The plan will be reviewed every five years. Bay of Plenty Coordinating Executive Group (CEG) will lead the review and will consult with all agencies with responsibilities or reference to the plan.

8.2 MONITORING PROGRESS

Table 8.1 illustrates the expectation in terms of plans that agencies will have in place to ensure they are able to undertake their responsibilities outlined in this Plan. Some agencies already have these in place.

All agencies will provide operational Evacuation Plans / procedure to BoP CEG within 12 months following the approval of this Plan. CEG will review and provide oversight that local CDEM evacuation plans are aligned with this Plan and with each other.

Table 8.1: Operational Plan Monitoring

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local CDEM / TLAs</td>
<td>Operational Evacuation Plans detailing:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evacuation Plans for own facilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Hazard analysis/evacuation scenarios.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evacuation triggers, areas, timing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vulnerable groups and how they will be supported.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Local infrastructure including details on runways and passenger numbers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Transport constraints and responsibilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supply and refueling plans.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Warning methods for different scenarios.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CDC location, facilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Registration processes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• CDC establishment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbouring Regions</td>
<td>Procedures detailing:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Detail analysis or modeling of likely numbers and the likely social behavior following an event.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Authorities</td>
<td>Operational Evacuation Plans detailing:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Preferred and alternate evacuation routes for different hazard scenarios and capacity.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Scalable’ traffic management plans (eg: use of more extreme measures) including consideration of contraflows.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Location of potential rest / welfare areas along route.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evacuation Plans for own facilities.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ Police</td>
<td>Operational Plans / Procedures detailing:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Evacuations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Management of evacuated area security.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Liaison processes with Road Authorities over traffic mgt, access for priority vehicles.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BoP Regional Council</td>
<td>Hazard information that facilitates evacuation planning (eg: tsunami inundation areas, volcanic eruption zones, flood risk areas).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHB, Corrections, Education</td>
<td>Evacuation plans / procedures for own facilities and plans to support ‘client’ facilities (hospitals, rest homes, schools, prisons, etc).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St John</td>
<td>Operational Plans as to how medical support can be provided along evacuation routes and at CDCs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare Agencies</td>
<td>Operational Plans for establishing / supporting CDCs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix A: Local Evacuation Plan

All Local CDEM sector agencies should prepare plans that outline the arrangements for contributing to Response and Recovery from an emergency. This template is aimed at giving Territorial Local Authorities (TLA’s) and Agencies a tool to draft local evacuation plans to support the CDEM Group effort in evacuation. The headings give plans a minimum format to assist TLAs and Agencies in writing their local evacuation plans.

It is important that the plan provides a way to think through the process and develop arrangements for addressing every stage of an emergency evacuation.

To ensure the success of this plan TLA’s and Agencies need to:

- Involve all partners.
- Address all hazards.
- Gather information, analyse and set out in logical steps.
- Identify roles and responsibilities, the allocated resources and establish accountability.
- Address all four R’s during planning (Possible they think about management, governance and administration).

Introduction

- **Purpose**
  - Explain the purpose of the plan and the importance to address evacuation within TLA’s.

- **Scope**
  - What is covered by the TLA/agency evacuation plan?
  - What is not covered by the TLA/agency evacuation plan?

- **Plan Framework**
  - Ensuring that the Local and agency plans are aligned with and in support of the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan and Evacuation Plan.
  - Consistent with Neighbouring TLA’s, Bay of Plenty Group, supporting agency plans and procedures.

(For more detail on this refer to Section 1 of the BoP Group Evacuation Plan)

Community Demographics

- **Overview of hazards**
  - Identify hazards within TLA’s that may impact on evacuation or lead to evacuations and the implication of agency plans. Hazards could include Earthquakes, Volcanic Eruptions, Tsunami, Flooding or a combination of.

Community/Vulnerability Analysis

- **People**
  - Overviews of the wider population within TLA. In agency plans identify community sector agencies will be supporting.
  - Identify communities within the TLA of significance and the impact it will have on planning. This could include Māori Communities and Vulnerable Groups example Low socio-economic areas and homeless, people with disabilities, elderly, remote/isolated areas etc.

- **Infrastructure**
  - Identify significant infrastructure specific to TLA, State highways, Hospitals, Prisons and Major rivers.
• Incorporate infrastructure plans into TLA plan including lifelines utilities that support these infrastructures.

(For more detail on this refer to Section 2 of the BoP Group Evacuation Plan)

Roles and responsibilities

Clearly identified and agreed roles and responsibilities
• TLA’s to identify agencies that are represented in TLA CDEM environment and how these agencies will support the evacuation process.
• TLA’s to identify what their roles and responsibilities will be during the 4 R’s.
• TLA and agencies to identify their limitations during an event and plan how to minimise the impact of these limitations.
• Identify resources that agencies have access to support evacuation process.

(For more detail on this refer to Section 3 of the Plan and Section 5 of the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan)

Evacuation Decision

• TLA’s and agencies to identify the triggers within each of the four steps below to decide to evacuate or to shelter-in-place. Each step has triggers to consider that might influence the decision:
  o Decision to activate EOC
  o Confirmation who the lead agency might be in different scenarios.
  o Factors to consider when planning whether to evacuate or shelter-in-place this could include time of the day, public safety, transport routes available, availability of transport and accessibility, etc.
  o Effect on vulnerable population (critically ill) ability to evacuate without causing undue harm.

(For more detail on the triggers refer to Section 4 of the Plan and the Response Management Directors Guide)

Evacuation Planning and Warning

• When completing evacuation planning at TLA level consider the triggers and actions.
  o Consideration might include early advice to key stakeholders, numbers and types of evacuees, timing and areas, preferred evacuation routes, public transport requirements, location of registration and CDCs and lifelines utilities constraints.
  o Key messages to evacuate include why, what areas, when to evacuate, and information on what to do before you leave, what to take with, how to evacuate (transport/route), where to evacuate to, how to get evacuation messages to effected and identify specific hazard messages before the event.
  o Key messages to be communicated, confirm the communication processes, and how messages will be disseminated.
  o Identify and have a relationship with local media that will support the dissemination process.

(For more detail on this refer to Section 5 of the Evacuation Plan)

Evacuation Phase

• The Traffic Management plan should include NZTA local TLA roading manager and cover potential road closures, over taking lanes, contra flows and details on resources required.
• The public transport plan should consider planning to include bus, rail and air transport operations and they should be part of the planning process.
Consider how to monitor and support the evacuation process, include possible rest areas, delivering of welfare support, access for emergency services, alternative emergency transport and secured evacuate areas.

(For more detail on this refer to Section 6 of the Evacuation Plan)

Shelter

- The shelter phase is the responsibility of the local welfare manager with the support of the Local Welfare Committee. The shelter phase includes the receiving, registration and temporary accommodation of evacuees.
  - Local welfare committee and local agencies should be part of the planning process to identify CDCs and ongoing support, the capacity and location of possible CDCs considering hazards.
  - Include how to receive/register evacuees, identify potential registration points and to confirm the registration process.
  - To ensure ongoing support of CDCs, plan for logistical requirements.
  - It is important to liaise with agencies before an event to identify what resources are available within the TLA and the resources that will have to be accessed from outside the area.

(For more detail on this refer to Section 7 of the Plan)

Appendixes

- The Local Evacuation Plan should include appendixes with detail mapping reflecting local hazards, key evacuation routes, CDC locations, significant lifelines, vulnerability population or any other information required to support the evacuation process.

Monitoring and Evaluation

- The template provided is available for TLA’s and agencies to use as a guide to draw up their own Local evacuation plans in support of the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Evacuation Plan, as stipulated in the “Development Phase (years 1-3) of the Bay of Plenty CDEM Group Plan 2011-2015 Section 9, Figure 9.1. Local plans should be reviewed in line with TLA LTP’s.
Appendix B: References

1. Mass Evacuation Planning (Directors Guideline for Civil Defence Emergency Management groups [DGL 07/08]
2. Bay of Plenty Fuel Contingency Plan, March 2013
4. Bay of Plenty Civil Defence Emergency Management Group Plan
5. Bay of Plenty Lifelines Group Vulnerability Study, April 2011
6. The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act (CDEM Act) 2002
7. The National CDEM Plan 2005
8. Guide to the National CDEM Plan
9. Statistics New Zealand
## Appendix C: Glossary of Key Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assisted-evacuees</td>
<td>People that do not have their own, or access to a, vehicle and therefore need assistance in the form of transport as part of the emergency response.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>The effectiveness of co-operation and co-ordination arrangements across agencies for the delivery of resources in the event of an emergency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Defence Centre (CDC)</td>
<td>Provide a range of welfare, support and recovery services for evacuees including emergency shelter, registration and social services, catering and public information management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM)</td>
<td>Stands for Civil Defence Emergency Management and means the application of knowledge, measures, and practices that: are necessary or desirable for the safety of the public or property, and are designed to guard against, prevent, reduce, or overcome any hazard or harm or loss that may be associated with any emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDEM Act</td>
<td>Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDEM Group</td>
<td>Means the Civil Defence Emergency Management Group which has been established under section 12 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate Accommodation</td>
<td>Hotels, motels, lodges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td>A situation in which people do not have basic things that they need to live a comfortable life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Health Board</td>
<td>The provider of publicly funded services for the population of a specific geographical area in New Zealand.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>Means a situation that:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• is the result of any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including (without limitation) any explosion, earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement, flood, storm, tornado, cyclone, serious fire, leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance, technological failure, infestation, plague, epidemic, failure of or disruption to an emergency service or a lifeline utility, or actual or imminent attack or warlike act; and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• causes or may cause loss of life or illness or distress or in any way endangers the safety of the public or property in New Zealand or any part of New Zealand; and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• cannot be dealt with by emergency services, or otherwise requires a significant and coordinated response under the Act (section of the Act)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Services</td>
<td>Includes the New Zealand Police, New Zealand Fire Service, National Rural Fire Authority, rural fire authorities, hospital and health services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Management Office</td>
<td>Carries out such functions as assigned to it by the CDEM Group. The Bay of Plenty Group EMO is currently based at Environment Bay of Plenty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Operations Centre</td>
<td>A centre established by the Lead Agency where the response to an event may be managed and supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation</td>
<td>The temporary relocation (either spontaneous or planned) of all or part of a particular population or geographical region from a location that has been or is about to be affected by an emergency, to a place considered to be safe. Evacuations can be mandatory, pre-event, voluntary, recommended, self and assisted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation assembly area</td>
<td>Pre-determined site outside of the impacted area established as an assembly area for evacuees en-route to a destination.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Defence Centre</td>
<td>Provides temporary emergency accommodation (for those evacuees who cannot accommodate themselves) and registration services (only for those who will be staying at the CDC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation-in-place</td>
<td>The concept of evacuating to a higher elevation within a current location. This may be appropriate for rapid onset hazards such as near-source tsunami.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group Controller</td>
<td>A person appointed by the CDEM Group as a Controller under Section 26 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hazard</td>
<td>Means something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency (Section 4 of the CDEM Act) and includes all hazards (i.e. natural, technological, and</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>biological sources)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lead Agency</td>
<td>The organisation with the legislative authority; or because of its expertise, resources or formal agreement, is primarily responsible for control of an incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifeline Utilities</td>
<td>Means an entity named or described in part A of Schedule 1, or that carries on a business described in Part B of Schedule 1 of the CDEM Act e.g. Power companies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>Means a regional council or territorial authority (as per the Local Government Act 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Controller</td>
<td>Means a person appointed by the CDEM Group as a Local Controller under Section 27 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory evacuation</td>
<td>Mandatory evacuation is directed when it is believed that the risk to residents is too great to allow them to remain where they are therefore placing a duty of responsibility on authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum Likely Event</td>
<td>Means the largest adverse event scenario that is manageable by the Group, is the Group’s responsibility to manage, and has a probability of occurrence high enough to merit attention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Controller</td>
<td>The person who is appointed in accordance with section 10 of the CDEM Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pacific Tsunami Warning Centre (PTWC)</td>
<td>United States National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration facility to alert recipients of the probability of a tsunami and that a tsunami investigation is underway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pick-up point</td>
<td>This is a local site within the impacted area for picking up members of the evacuating population who require transportation and/or other assistance in evacuating an at-risk area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reception Centre</td>
<td>Provide those affected by an emergency event with access to information and initial support from social service agencies. Reception Centres are involved in the provision of emergency accommodation. Auckland Welfare Coordinating Group member agencies provide appropriate staff and resource at Reception Centres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended evacuation</td>
<td>When the threat has a high probability of affecting people living in at-risk areas and they are encouraged to leave but the decision to do so is left to individuals.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recovery</td>
<td>The coordinated process of reconstruction of infrastructure and the restoration of social, economic and physical well-being of a disaster-affected community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Actions taken in anticipation of, during and immediately after an emergency or disaster to ensure that its effects are minimised and that people affected are given immediate relief and support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest areas</td>
<td>Areas evacuees can be diverted to if traffic becomes overly congested.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Means the chance of something happening that will have an impact on people and property – measured in terms of consequences (impacts) and likelihood (frequency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe point</td>
<td>Area that is deemed safe from the risk posed by the hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-evacuees / evacuation</td>
<td>People leave their current location because of actual or perceived risk without being directed to do so and require no immediate assistance with accommodation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self evacuees</td>
<td>People that can leave their current location via their own means of transport such as a personal car, bike or other vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging area</td>
<td>Pre-determined site outside of the impacted area established to stage and coordinate transportation resources in support of pick-up point operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support Agency</td>
<td>Any agency that assists the lead agency during an emergency. Supporting documentation includes detailed explanations, standard operating procedures, the Director’s guidelines, codes, and technical standards.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport Support Group</td>
<td>Establishment of this group is recommended by the MCDEM to help develop and implement a coordinated Traffic Control Management Plan between all agencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vertical evacuation</td>
<td>On a different floor or level of a facility/building.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Voluntary evacuation (‘Shadow’)</td>
<td>Occupants of areas outside the evacuation zone that leave despite the fact they are not threatened by the hazard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulnerable Communities</td>
<td>At-risk groups that may need special consideration in order to ensure that they can be taken care of in an evacuation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>Welfare response is a coordinated action undertaken by government and non-government social services agencies and organisations to ensure that individuals, families and communities affected by an emergency have information on, and easy access to, the range of services available to or needed by them.</td>
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